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COMMENT

VOLUNTARY MINOR MENTAL PATIENTS:
A REALISTIC BALANCING OF THE
COMPETING INTERESTS OF PARENT,
CHILD, AND STATE
by Robert M. O'Boyle

HE possibility of committing a minor child to a mental institution
is far removed from the concerns of most people. Nevertheless, a
significant number of children have been institutionalized' in state2
and private mental hospitals pursuant to state statutory procedures.
These minor mental patients are generally regarded as belonging to a class
similar to that of voluntary adult mental patients 3 but use of the term
1. According to the 1970 census, of all institutionalized persons below the age of 21,
42% were in mental institutions, while only 23% were in special facilities for juvenile offenders. I PRACTISING LAW INST. MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 399 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT].
2. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-52-51 to -55 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47,30.670-.695 (Supp.
1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-518 to -519 (1974 & Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1403
(Supp. 1983); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6000(b) (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 27-10-103 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-187 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5123
(1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-511 to -512 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.465 (West 1983);
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 to .3 (Supp. 1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60(a) (1976); IDAHO
CODE §§ 66-318 to -322 (Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 3-500 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-2 (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 229.2 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2905 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 202A.020
(1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:57 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2290
(1978); MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. § 10-610 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
123, § 10 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 330.1411, .1415 (1980); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253A.03 (West 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-103(2)(c) (1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 632.110, .115 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112 (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-1019 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.140(l) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 135-B:9 to :11 (1977 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-46 (West 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1-16 (1979); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 19831984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-56.3, .5 (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-04 (Supp.
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A,

§ 184 (West 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.220(1) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402-4403
(Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1983-1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-310 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-8-2 to -4 (1977 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33601 (Supp. 1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-23 (Vernon 1958); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-7-29 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7503 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 37.1-64 to 65 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.23.070 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 27-4-1 (1980);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.10(2) (West Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 25-10-106 (1977).

3. Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1983).
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"voluntary" may be inaccurate in the context of minors institutionalized
by a parent or guardian. Under voluntary commitment statutes the parent,
not the child, seeks institutionalization of the child for treatment of mental
illness. 4 Thereafter, the minor child's confinement continues primarily at
the discretion of the parents.5 Adult voluntary patients, on the other hand,
may usually secure their own release upon written application. 6 Similarly,
an adult voluntary patient may choose among and reject certain forms of
treatment, 7 but the minor mental patient's power to refuse treatments is
vested in the parent or guardian.8 This broad parental control rests upon
constitutional deference to family privacy 9 and upon the assumptions that
parents act in their children's best interests and that children are incapable
of making rational decisions regarding medical treatment.i
Concern for the constitutional rights of voluntary minor mental patients
is a natural extension of the movements toward recognition of the rights of
minors and of mental patients in general. Cases involving the constitutional rights of voluntary minor mental patients that have reached the
United States Supreme Court have not presented fact situations amenable
to blanket rulings or the pronouncement of broad constitutional principles." Consequently, much uncertainty remains as to the limits on the
constitutional rights of voluntary minor mental patients and their parents,
and the powers of the state. 12 This Comment explores these areas of uncertainty and suggests the proper limits on the rights and powers of voluntary minor mental patients, their parents, and the state. A discussion of the
substantial risks and dangers inherent in the institutionalization of minors
evidences the cause for concern regarding the commitment of minors for
mental illness. A brief treatment of the foundations of the movements to4. Some state statutes provide that adolescents of specified ages may unilaterally seek
institutionalization for the treatment of mental illness. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17205(f) (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 9 1/2, § 3-502 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
5. Generally, the parent requests that the child be released. Many states, however,
have statutes providing that the hospital administrator should also exercise independent
judgment and release the child should hospitalization no longer be required. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 to .3 (Supp. 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7201-7207 (Purdon
Supp. 1983-1984).
6. Fearing that the adult patient might leave once meaningful treatment had begun,
most states adopted statutes providing that voluntary patients could be detained for a statutorily prescribed time after giving notice of their intention to withdraw from the facility.
Ellis, Volunteering Children. Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 840, 844 n.19 (1974).
7. An adult involuntary patient even has the right to refuse dangerous drugs such as
antipsychotic medication. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd inpart
and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
8. Uncertainty remains, however, concerning the limitations on parental power to supervise the treatment program. See Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir.
1983) (discussed infra notes 181-98).
9. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925).
10. Parham v,J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
11. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
12. See Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1983).
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ward recognition of the rights of mental patients in general and of children's rights helps frame the analysis of Supreme Court cases involving the
competing interests of parent, child, and state. The limitations on these
interests are then discussed in the context of Supreme Court cases involving the voluntary commitment of minors to mental institutions. Finally,
the Comment sets forth a proposed analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in an attempt to remove existing uncertainties and to find a constitutional balance that will more adequately protect the liberty interests of
minor children.
I.

CONCERNS RAISED BY THE VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF MINORS
TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS

A marked increase in the number of minor mental patients has accompanied the widespread adoption of laws allowing parents to commit their
children to mental institutions. In 1952 less than 20% of the states had
laws allowing parents voluntarily to commit their children to psychiatric
inpatient facilities.' 3 A movement for the passage of voluntary commitment statutes had already begun, however,' 4 and within a few years a majority of states passed legislation that allowed parents to volunteer their
children for commitment. 15 The result in one state was a greater than
700% increase in the number of minor mental patients committed to its
state hospitals in the five-year period following enactment of the voluntary
commitment statute.' 6 By 1972, 42% of all institutionalized persons under
the age of eighteen were in mental health care facilities. ' 7 In contrast, only
23% of institutionalized minors were in special facilities for juvenile delinquents.18 The substantial and increasing population of minor mental patients illustrates the fact that judicial and legislative pronouncements
concerning voluntary minor mental patients affect a large proportion of
persons in state hospitals. As procedural safeguards concerning the commitment of adult mental patients have become more stringent, the percentage of hospitalized adults has decreased. This trend has been
accompanied by a steady increase in the percentage of persons below age
twenty-four admitted to mental hospitals, with the most noticeable increase occurring in the age group of fifteen and under.' 9
13.

Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally 11, 50 MICH. L. REV. 837, 855-56 (1952).

14. Institute of Mental Health's Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill, Public Health Service Publication No. 51 (1951), cited in Weihofen, supra note 13, at 859
n.52.
15. Ellis, supra note 6, at 844 n.22.
16. Id. at 844 (citing CAL. ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL AND HANDICAPPED CHILDREN, REPORT ON SERVICES FOR THE HANDICAPPED AND MENTALLY DISORDERED CHILDREN 146 (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON SERVICES]). In 1954 the

number of minor mental patients, patients below 21 years of age, in California represented
1.3% of the total hospital population. By 1959 minor mental patients constituted 9.2% of the
state hospital population. Id.
17.

1 MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 1, at 399.

18. Id. Nineteen percent of institutionalized minors were located in centers for dependent and neglected children. Id.
19. Harris, Mental Illness, Due Processand Lawyers, 55 A.B.A. J. 65, 67 (1969).
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Persons committed to mental health care institutions may experience
substandard care, lowered self-esteem, and the reinforcement of aberrant
behavior by fellow patients. Minors committed during the formative years
of their lives may be particularly affected by these factors. Numerous
studies indicate that persons committed to institutions, particularly minor
children, are susceptible to a lowering in social competence 20 and intelligence. 2 1 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
commitment to an inpatient facility necessarily entails a "massive curtailment of liberty" 22 that is not diminished by the institution's desire to rehabilitate the minor.23 Indeed, many of the mental health care facilities that
house minors are regimented and impersonal and provide simple custodial
care rather than treatment designed to rehabilitate the child. 24 Such ineffectual care probably results from a lack of adequate funding and qualified
personnel. 25 The inadequate facilities and the severe social and self stigmatization 26 that result from commitment to mental institutions 27 are particularly appalling in 28light of the possibility that a minor will be
wrongfully committed.
In many voluntary commitment situations the problems that the child is
experiencing do not constitute a mental illness requiring commitment to an
institution. Many psychologists believe that a substantial number of these
minors merely exhibit behavior patterns that their parents disapprove of
20. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1308 n.40
(E.D. Pa. 1977) ("skills" learned at school were often antisocial and showed regression); see
also Teitlebaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children. Due Process Rights and TheirApplication, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 184 (1978) (citing Guthrie, Butler & Gorlow, PersonalityDifferences Between Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Retardates, 67 AM. J. MENTAL
DEFICIENCY 543 (1963) (negative self-attitude); Mitchell & Smeriglio, Growth in Social Competence in InstitutionalizedMentally Retarded Children, 74 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 666
(1970) (deterioration in social competence unless special programming provided)).
21. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 20, at 183 (citing Silverstein, Changes in the Measured Intelligence of InstitutionalizedRetardates as a Function ofHospitalAge, 1 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 125 (1969); Sternlicht & Siegel, Institutional Residence and Intellectual

Functioning, 12 J.

MENTAL DEFICIENCY RESEARCH

119 (1968)).

22. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
23. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 n.12 (1975).

24. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 20, at 181 (citing R. SCHEERENBERGER, DEINSTITU(1976); Mason & Menolascino, The Right to

TIONALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens. An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10

L. REV. 124 (1976)).
25. N. HOBBS, THE FUTURES

CREIGHTON

OF CHILDREN

127-28 (1975).

For instance, in 1968 the

U.S. government reported that the daily expenditure on patients in mental health care facilities ranged between $3.00 and $12.00. During the same time period five of the nation's
largest zoos were spending an average of $7.00 a day to care for their larger animals. Id.
26. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967) ("delinquent" label has come to involve
almost as much stigma as "criminal" for adults).
27. Social stigma, self-stigmatization, and job and license discrimination are products of
commitment to mental institutions. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
28. Once committed to an institution, a minor mental patient remains institutionalized
longer, on the average, than his adult counterpart. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
NIMH, Statistical Note 90, Utilization of Psychiatric Facilitiesby Persons Under 18 Years of
Age, United States, 1971, table 9 [hereinafter cited as NIMH Statistical Note 90].
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and feel unable to change. 29 In 1975 the most common diagnosis (54.3%)
of juveniles admitted to state and county mental institutions was "transient
situational disorders and behavioral disorders of childhood. 30° Often, less
stringent treatment alternatives have not been attempted prior to seeking
commitment of the child, and a majority of juveniles (53% in 1969) entering mental health care facilities have not received any prior psychiatric
treatment. 3' This statistic may reflect the socioeconomic posture of many
parents who wish to institutionalize their children.3 2 Thus, even parents
who desire the advice of an independent psychiatrist or psychologist prior
to seeking commitment of the minor,33 or who might prefer
less drastic
4
forms of treatment, simply may not be able to afford it.3
Even if a parent is able to obtain the services of an independent psychiatrist or psychologist prior to seeking the institutionalization of the child,
the doctor might not make his diagnosis with the best interests of the child
foremost in his mind. Although the traditional position taken by medical
professionals is that they operate in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of their
patients,35 when the parent rather than the child comes to the doctor for
advice, it may not be possible for the doctor to make a truly independent
diagnosis.3 6 The parent is generally the most readily available, reliable
source of information relating to the child's environment and life exper37
iences, as well as the person who compensates the doctor for his services.
Studies also indicate that the diagnosis of an admitting physician at a
state or private mental hospital may not be valid.3 8 In one experiment
designed to test the validity of such evaluations,3 9 eight healthy persons
29. B. ENNIS & L. SEIGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 38 (1973); see Comment,
Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerationsin Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE
L.J. 1178, 1182-83 (1947).
30. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, NIMH, Statistical Note 138, Diagnostic Distribution ofAdmissions to Inpatient Services of State and County Mental Hospitals, United States,
1975.

31. NIMH Statistical Note 90, supra note 28, table 9.
32. T. LIDZ, S. FLECK & A. CORNELLISON, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY 131
(1965).
33. A survey of the parents of voluntarily committed minor mental patients at California's Napa State Hospital Children's Unit indicated that parents were influenced by independent professional psychiatric or medical advice in only 36% of the commitment cases.
In 73% of the cases the parents' only outside advice was provided by probation officers,
welfare workers, and public school officials. Ellis, supra note 6, at 851 (citing REPORT ON
SERVICES, supra note 16, at 227.
34. Upper-middle-class families have access to alternate forms of treatment, such as
private psychiatric counseling or clinical treatment, that are not available to families in the
lower socioeconomic categories. T. LIDZ, S. FLECK & A. CORNELLISON, supra note 32, at
131.
35. See generally 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 166-73

(1981).
36. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 147-49 (1966).
37. Id. Sociologist Scheff tells of an interview with a committing doctor who did not
feel that an in-depth, objective valuation was needed in cases involving the voluntary commitment of minors. The doctor felt that if the child's family had sought commitment, a
pathology was surely present. Id.
38. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973), reprintedin 13
SANTA CLARA LAW.

39. Id.

379 (1973).
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applied for voluntary admission at twelve different mental hospitals. The
eight pseudopatients claimed to have heard voices saying "empty" or
"thud." In each attempted admission the pseudopatient was diagnosed as
40
schizophrenic or manic-depressive and admitted to the mental hospital.
In a followup study staff members at a mental hospital were warned of a
similar false attempt. No pseudopatients were presented to the hospital for
voluntary admission, but out of 193 patients evaluated by admitting staff
following the warning, 21% were identified as pseudopatients by at least
4
one staff member, and 12% were so identified by at least one psychiatrist. 1
II.

THE TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS

Concern for the constitutional rights of voluntary minor mental patients
is but one aspect of the broader movement for increased recognition of the
rights of all mental patients. Persons suffering from mental illness were
once thought to be possessed by spirits. 42 Once committed to a mental
institution a person generally had little hope for a return to society unless
43
friends or relatives strenuously sought release through outside channels.
Commitment thus amounted to permanent incarceration designed to remove the mentally ill from the mainstream of life. Given the permanence
of commitment, there was some early concern that debtors and beggars
might be singled out for institutionalization in order to circumvent the
prohibitions against imprisonment of debtors. 44 Widespread apprehension
about commitment procedures did not surface, however, until the late
1800s, following the highly-publicized story of a wrongful commitment. 45
The ensuing outcry resulted in the adoption in numerous states of legislation that provided for close judicial scrutiny of the commitment process. 46
The growing concern for procedural safeguards sparked a controversy
that continues to this day between the legal and medical professions over
the form such safeguards should take. The basic argument by the psychiatric community contends that an unnecessary emphasis has been placed
40. 13

SANTA CLARA LAW. at 384.
41. Id. at 386. The foregoing is not intended to foster an alarmist attitude or cloud with
emotionalism the issues to be discussed later in this Comment. Losing sight of these basic
causes for concern regarding the commitment of minors to mental institutions, however, is
easy when discussing entrenched constitutional principles in an academic fashion. The
practical concerns of many psychiatrists, psychologists, attorneys, and others must be emphasized in order to motivate the courts to protect more adequately the liberty interests of
children voluntarily committed to mental hospitals by their parents.
42. M. McDONALD, MYSTICAL BEDLAM 7, 11 (1981).
43. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 202-03 (1965).
44. N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 64 (1971).
45. See Comment, supra note 29, at 1192 n.6 1. Mrs. Dorothy Packard was the victim of
wrongful commitment at the hands of her husband, an evangelist, who was angry with her
for publicly expressing theological views in conflict with his own. Once Mrs. Packard had
won her release from confinement, she began to campaign actively for legislation providing
more stringent procedural safeguards for the involuntary commitment of citizens to mental
institutions. In addition, Mrs. Packard wrote a seven-volume critique of the psychiatric

profession and the means by which individuals were committed to institutions. Id.
46. N. KITRIE, supra note 44, at 64.
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upon the constitutional rights of persons who are ill and in need of immediate treatment. 47 Furthermore, the requirement of stringent judicial review of commitments pits family member against family member and
causes harmful delay in implementing treatment programs. 4 8 Regardless
of the validity of these arguments, they had a significant impact during the
post-World War II era, resulting in the relaxation of many commitment
statutes and a shifting of power from jurists to psychiatrists. 4 9 Judicial
deference to the interests of mental health care professionals in the commitment and treatment process continues today, and may help to explain
regarding the voluntary commitment of minors to
recent judicial decisions
50
mental institutions.
Several recent cases dealing with the rights of involuntarily committed
mental patients illustrate the conflict over the nature of procedural safeguards and the Supreme Court's position on the issue. In Youngberg v.
Romeo 5 ' a severely retarded adult brought suit against state hospital officials, alleging a three-fold violation of his constitutional rights.5 2 The
plaintiff contended, first, that his fourteenth amendment liberty interest
had been infringed by the institution's staff in shackling him to his bed.
Second, the staffs failure to guard his personal security and protect him
from other patients similarly violated his liberty interest. Finally, he argued that the institution had failed to provide him with minimal rehabilitative training. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and
remanded the district court's determination because it had improperly
based its decision on the eighth amendment protection against cruel and
53
unusual incarceration, a protection inapplicable to civil confinement.
The court of appeals did conclude, however, that even institutionalized
mental patients have a residuum of liberty that cannot be infringed without due process.5 4 The court further held that the first two alleged violations could only be justified by a showing of compelling necessity, while
47. See Curran,Hospitalizationofthe Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274, 293 (1953). See
generally Kadish, A Case Study in the Significanceof Procedural Due Process-Institutionalizing the Mentaly 111, 9 W. POL. Q. 93 (1956).
48. Curran, supra note 47, at 293; see also Treffert & Krojek, In Search ofa Sane Commitment Statute, in PSYCHIATRY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: A CONTINUING DEBATE (R.

Bonnie ed. 1977); Chodoff, The Casefor Involuntary Hospitalizationof the Mentaly 111, 133
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976); McGarry, The Holy Legal War Against State HospitalPsychiatry, 294 NEw ENG. J. MED. 318 (1976).

49. Ellis, supra note 6, at 842-43. Some of these "relaxed" state statutes have been ruled

unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
50. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612 (1979) (state's interest in efficiency permits

review of commitment decisions by state hospital psychiatrist, a neutral factfinder); Secre-

tary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640, 646 (1979) (independent

psychiatric review by one psychiatrist is adequate protection against improvident
commitments).
51. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

52. Although Youngberg dealt with the rights of a severely retarded, not a mentally ill,
person, the issues presented in such a case are largely the same as in one involving a mentally ill child.
53. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1980).
54. Id.
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the third was subject to more flexible review due to the mixed medicallegal nature of the issues raised with regard to rehabilitative training. 55
The Supreme Court agreed in Youngberg that involuntarily committed
persons possess a residuum of liberty that is protected by the fourteenth
amendment, 56 but differed on the appropriate standard for reviewing alleged infringements of that liberty. The Court stated that a professional's
decision is presumed valid. 57 Consequently, such a decision violates the
patient's due process rights only when that decision is "such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as
to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. 5 8s Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, but argued that virtually any decision made by an institutional
physician could meet such a standard. 59
In Rogers v. Okin 60 and Rennie v. Klein6 1 mentally ill patients challenged the institutions' ability to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication, which can have severe side effects. In both cases the district courts
held that mental patients have the right to refuse forcible treatment under
the constitutional right of privacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment. 6 2
Both courts qualified this right of refusal by holding that it could be bypassed in emergency situations involving a substantial likelihood of physical harm to the patient or others in the hospital. 63 On appeal the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Rogers that the emergency situation definition was too narrow and unworkable. 64 Instead, the court stated that
attending physicians must engage in an ad hoc balancing of the need to
prevent either violence or the further deterioration of the patient's condition with the possibility of harmful side effects to the medicated individual. 65 In addition, the doctors must have ruled out other reasonable
alternatives. 66 The court remanded the case and instructed the district
court to fashion suitable procedures to ensure that a patient's interests are
properly weighed in such a balancing process. 67 In Rennie the Third Circuit also agreed that mental patients may be forcibly medicated in emergency situations, but held that due process must be provided in
n6nemergency situations. 68 The court found the constitutional due process
55. Id. at 165.
56. 457 U.S. at 315.
57. Id. at 323.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 330-31 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
60. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st

Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).

61. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction denied), 476 F.
Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (class certified; preliminary injunction granted), modfied, 653 F.2d

836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
62. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1366; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144.

63. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1365; Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1313.
64. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 659-60 (Ist Cir. 1980).

65. Id. at 661.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 850-53 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).

COMMENT

19841

1187

standard satisfied by the informal administrative procedures offered under
New Jersey law. 69 Under the New Jersey statute a patient could be forcibly medicated if, after an independent review, the institution's medical director agreed with the attending physician that antipsychotic drugs were
director was further required to make a weekly
mandated. 70 The medical
71
cases.
such
of
review
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases. In a brief opinion,
the Court vacated and remanded Rogers for reconsideration in light of a
recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.72 The
Court noted that the state court decision may have created liberty interests
under state law that exceeded those required by the federal Constitution.
Rennie was remanded for consideration in light of Youngberg.73 The
Supreme Court's disposition of these cases suggests considerable deference
to the professional judgment of attending physicians. Such deference is
especially evident in the standard of review enunciated in Youngberg.
III.

THE MOVEMENT FOR RECOGNITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF MINORS

The movement for recognition of the constitutional rights of voluntary
minor mental patients also has roots in the child advocacy movement. Until fairly recent times, children were generally accorded second-class status
by the law. For instance, when English courts developed the concept of
tort liability in damages for the wrongful death of a family member, parental recovery for the loss of a child was limited to the pecuniary loss that
a parent would suffer as a result of the discontinuation of the child's services. 74 The status of the child was viewed as closely analogous to that of
the parent's servant. American courts later limited recovery in a similar
fashion, making use of the master/servant analogy. 75 By the beginning of
the twentieth century, however, there was a growing recognition of the
problems facing children and the child's need for special social protection,
resulting in the creation of many social mechanisms designed to promote
the welfare of children. 76 The United States Supreme Court confirmed the
new status of the minor as a person in In re Gaull,77 stating that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 7 8
69. Id. at 851-52.
70. Id. at 848.
71. Id. at 848-49.
72. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 304-06 (1982); see In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass.

1981).
73. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
74. Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
75. See, e.g., McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320,
325-26 (1902); March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 (1877).
76. See Takanishi, Childhoodas a Social Issue: HistoricalRoots of Contemporary Child
Advocacy Movements, 34 J.Soc. ISSUEs 8 (1978). Such mechanisms included child developmental psychology, pediatrics, and child welfare programs. Id. at 8-9.
77. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
78. Id. at 13.
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In Gault a juvenile court adjudged a fifteen-year-old delinquent for purportedly making lewd telephone calls and ordered him placed in an industrial school until he reached twenty-one. The maximum penalty for the
same offense by an adult offender was a few months in jail or a relatively
small fine. The minor was not afforded counsel, no witness appeared
against him, no record was made of the proceedings, and a purported admission was used against him although he was not informed of his right to
remain silent. The state supreme court refused his mother's writ of habeas
79
corpus, but the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision.
Prior to Gault the statement that the basic right of a juvenile is "not to
liberty but to custody" was widely accepted. 80 If the parents defaulted in
effectively performing their custodial functions, the state could intervene.
Thus the state was substituted as custodian, but no rights of the child were
implicated. 8 1 Consequently, the child need not be accorded procedural
due process. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that children, like adults, have a constitutionally recognized interest in freedom
from physical restraint. 82 Children are thus entitled to due process in juvenile proceedings since that is the "primary and indispensable foundation
of individual freedom. ' 83 The Court concluded that due process requires
that an alleged juvenile offender be given notice of the charges against
him, a right to counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege available in adult criminal proceedings against
84
self-incrimination.
While the United States Supreme Court has continued to emphasize
that the constitutional guarantees of the fourteenth amendment extend to
children as well as adults, 85 the Court has limited the rights of children in
two ways: by holding that the parens patriae doctrine 86 allows the state to
exercise greater control over the conduct of children than it can exercise
over adults, 87 and by giving constitutional status to the right of parents to
control the upbringing and conduct of their children. 88 The Court has
justified these limitations on constitutional rights on the grounds that chil79. Id. at 59.
80. Id. at 17 (citing Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (S. Ct. Pa. 1839)).

81. 387 U.S. at 17.
82. Id. at 27; see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1975) (extension of constitu-

tional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecution).
83. 387 U.S. at 20.

84. Id. at 33-57.
85. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1978); Planned Parenthood v.

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.

86. Parens patriae is the legal doctrine that provides that the state may care for those of
its citizens who suffer from actual or legal disabilities such as insanity, mental incapacity, or
minority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).

87. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
88. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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dren are more susceptible to harm than adults, 89 children generally do not
possess the capacity for rational judgment that an adult has, 90 and the constitutional preference for the sanctity of the family unit may necessarily
entail a curtailment of the child's rights.9' The Court has expressly declined, however, to formulate a rule of widespread applicability that would
define the boundaries of the constitutional rights of children in most situations.9 2 Instead, the Court has taken an ad hoc approach to resolving conflicts between the competing constitutional interests of parent, child, and
state that are presented in the many cases dealing with the constitutional
rights of children.
Of the cases ruled on by the Court concerning the boundaries of the
constitutional rights of children, some have presented conflict between the
interests of the parent and the state, 93 while others have presented conflict
between the interests of the child and the state. 94 Whenever possible, the
Court assumes that the interest of parent and child coincide and that the
95
only conflict presented is between the interests of the child and the state.
In the child versus state situation, the test of constitutionality asks whether
a significant state interest justifies a limitation upon the rights of the
child. 96 The Court's analysis is different, however, when the interests of
the parent and child conflict.
The Supreme Court has recognized a right of family privacy or autonomy that is implicit in the moral fabric of the nation and seems to have
98
97
elevated this right to constitutional status. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters
the Court held that a statute prohibiting education at private schools unnecessarily interfered with the right of parents and guardians to control the
upbringing and education of their children. 99 In Wisconsin v. Yoder 100 the
Court again emphasized the crucial role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children, noting that this relationship is implicit in the history and
culture of western civilization, and is "now established beyond debate as
In Yoder Amish parents challenged
an enduring American tradition."''
89. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 169 (1944) ("[S]treets afford dangers for [children] not affecting adults.").
90. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 528 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968).
91. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.

510, 519 (1925).
92. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968); Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.

93. Eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

94. Eg., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. i (1967).
95. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines

Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
96. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
97. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390

U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
98. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

99. Id. at 534-35.
100. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
101. Id. at 232.
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Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law as violative of the first
amendment free exercise clause. The parents contended that formal education beyond the eighth grade was contrary to the Amish concept of life
aloof from the world and its material values. A majority of the Court concluded that the statute impermissibly intruded on the parent's right to
guide the upbringing of their children, notwithstanding the admitted
power of the state in regulating basic education. 10 2 The majority stated
that state intervention in the right of parental control would only be justified "if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health 10or3
safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."'
The majority did not feel that a conflict between the interests of the parent
and child had been properly presented.' °4 Both Justice Douglas in dissent10 5 and Justice White in concurrence, 1' however, noted the fact that
the children of Amish parents might have religious preferences different
from those of their parents, which would not be recognized under the majority opinion. Although the Court did not consider the issue of whether
the interests of the parent and child were in opposition in Pierce and
action that unnecessarily interfered
Yoder, the Court did preclude state
10 7
autonomy.
of
right
family
the
with
The Supreme Court has, however, limited parental rights of control and
supervision over children in some specific circumstances. 10 8 Restrictive
opinions by state and lower federal courts are more numerous, and have
limited parental authority with respect to juvenile curfews, 109 drinking age
2
laws,1 0 sex education,"' blood transfusions, 1 corporal punishment, 13
and abortion. 14 The parental right to consent to medical treatment 1 5 has
often been usurped in favor of state control when the child is in danger of
suffering grievous harm. 1 6 These opinions suggest that the family's right
102. Id. at 231-32.
103. Id. at 234.

104. Id. at 230-34.
105. Id. at 242.
106. Id. at 240.
107. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
108. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental right to veto
abortion decision invalidated); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (sustaining conviction of parent under state child labor law for permitting child to sell religious materials
on city streets).
109. Bykofsky v.Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
110. Republican College Council v. Winner, 357 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
111. Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
112. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952).
113. Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
114. In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972).
115. Parents generally have had the right to give or withhold consent for most types of
medical treatment of their children. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir.
1941); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975).
116. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952);
Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974); see also Note, Child Neglect: Due Processforthe Parent, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 472
(1970) (state should not be allowed to interfere in parental decisions without demonstrating
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of privacy is strongest when the parents claim authority within their own
household to direct the rearing of children,' 17 due to the great emphasis
placed by the Supreme Court on family unity. When parents attempt to
invoke the power of the state in controlling their children, however, their
action indicates that the family unit is not able independently to resolve
the problem. In such a situation the family right of privacy arguably
should be given less prominence in any decision affecting the opposing
views of parent, child, and state.
Although the Supreme Court has taken an ad hoc approach to the issues
raised by voluntary commitment of minors to mental institutions, the
Court has suggested several means by which to analyze such cases. The
remainder of this Comment evaluates those decisions raising the concerns
of minor mental patients, in the hope that through application of a more
realistic analysis a conclusion can be reached that will more adequately
protect the liberty interests of minor mental patients.
IV.

CASES DEALING SPECIFICALLY WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF

VOLUNTARY MINOR MENTAL PATIENTS

The United States Supreme Court has decided only a few cases concerning the constitutional rights of voluntary minor mental patients," 8 but
state and lower federal courts have frequently addressed the issue. The
most significant state court decisions have extended the rights enjoyed by
voluntary adult mental patients to adolescents of specified ages based upon
interpretations of state legislation."l 9 In In re Lee 120 an Illinois court held
that the state's voluntary admission statute' 2 ' would allow juvenile patients to request and obtain their own releases from institutionalization
without parental consent. In Melville v. Sabbatino 122 a Connecticut court
held that a state statute123 that allowed voluntary commitment of minors
below age sixteen and commitment upon personal application by minors
sixteen years of age or older also allowed minors over sixteen to remove
themselves from institutions regardless of whether their parents originally
that child has been inflicted or threatened with serious harm); Note, State Intrusion into
Family Affairs: Justfcations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1398-99 (1974) (standard is one of "severity and irreversibility" of harm to child). But see In re Hudson, 13

Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (parental refusal to permit removal of daughter's grossly
deformed arm upheld despite fact that condition would result in permanent psychological
and circulatory damage).
117. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
118. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutional-

ized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
119. Some states have statutes that enable minor children to seek psychiatric care without their parents' consent. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-51 (1977); MD. HEALTH-GENERAL
CODE ANN. § 10-609 (Supp. 1983).
120. No. 68 (JD) 1362 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., Juv. Div., Feb. 29, 1972), abstracted in
6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 284 (1972); No. 68 (JD) 1362 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct., Juv. Div.,
Aug. 24, 1972), abstracted in 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 575 (1973).
121. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 5-1 to -2 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
122. 30 Conn. Supp. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (Super. Ct. 1973).
123. Patient's Bill of Rights, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-206a to -206k (1983).
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sought the admission.124 Such decisions reflect not only reasonable interpretations of state legislation and a proper concern for the care of minor
mental patients, but also a view that has gathered great support among
psychological researchers-that adolescents at approximately age fifteen
are able to exercise rational judgment concerning their own institutional25
ization and treatment.1
The first federal decision that clearly addressed the issue of a minor's
rights when the interest of minor, parent, and state conflict was Saville v.
Treadway. 126 In Saville the minor was retarded, not mentally ill, but the
constitutional issues presented to the court were largely the same as those
in a case involving a minor mental patient. The court initially noted that
the state commitment statute effectively permitted a parent or guardian to
commit a child without restriction and that commitment is potentially lifelong in duration.127 The court held that when individual liberty is at stake,
it is "absolutely essential" under the due process clause that confinement
be preceded by adequate procedural safeguards. 28 The court concluded
that the statute's reliance on parental discretion was unconstitutional since
children's and parents' interests can, and do, differ. 129 The court ordered
the establishment of an independent review board to determine the appropriateness of admission of all chidlren under sixteen years of age. 130 Saville never reached the Supreme Court.
Bartley v. Kremens 3 involved a class action suit brought on behalf of
the named plaintiffs and all persons eighteen years old or younger who
had been or would be committed to Pennsylvania's mental health care facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been denied equal protection
and due process of law because they had been committed to Pennsylvania's mental health care facilities without adequate procedural safeguards. The federal district court noted initially that while parents are
presumed to act in the best interests of the child, they do not always do
so. 132 Consequently, the possibility of erroneous commitments clearly existed under the state's voluntary commitment system. 133 The court concluded that the state must therefore provide the child with substantial
procedural protections, which may not be waived by the parent or guardian. 34 The district court did acknowledge, however, that the opinions and
124. 313 A.2d at 889.
125. See, e.g., Grisso v. Vierling, Minor's Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Pers etive, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412 (1978); Rosenberg & Katz, Legal Issues in Psychiatric
Treatment of Minors, 4 MENTAL HEALTH DiG. 54 (1972); Worsfold, A PhilosophicalJustSfcationfor Children'sRights, 44 HARV. EDUC. REV. 142 (1974).
126. 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
127. Id. at 432.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 438. The court required one of the three board members to be the parent of a
retarded person. Id.
131. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
132. 402 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1048.

1984]

COMMENT

1193

observations of parents should continue to carry great weight in the commitment process, although they could no longer be conclusive. 135 The district court established the following procedural safeguards to ensure that
the due process rights of voluntary minor mental patients would not be
violated: a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of the initial
137
commitment;1 36 a postcommitment judicial hearing within two weeks;
written notice of the hearing to the minor detailing the grounds for the
proposed commitment; 138 counsel for the minor, including indigent minors, at all significant points in the commitment process,' 3 9 and a requirement of a finding established by clear and convincing proof that the child
needs institutionalization. 14
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bartley, 14 1 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a Mental Health Procedures Act that substantially expanded the procedural safeguards afforded minors aged fourteen
or older.142 Although Justice Brennan was anxious to decide the case on
its merits, a majority of the Court concluded that the enactment of the
Pennsylvania statute had rendered the case moot and remanded the
case. 143

The Supreme Court finally addressed the due process issue in Parham v.
JR.144 and Secretary of Public We/fare v. InstitutionalizedJuveniles. 145 In
Parham two minor mental patients brought a class action suit 146 alleging

that they had been deprived of their right to due process in two respects. 147
48
First, the minors claimed that Georgia's voluntary commitment statute
was unconstitutional in not providing a hearing prior to commitment. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that their due process rights had been violated
because the state had made no attempt to determine whether or not treatment in a less restrictive environment would be more conducive to their
rehabilitation. The challenged statute provided that upon application of
the child's parent or guardian 149 the superintendent of the particular state
mental hospital could temporarily admit a child for observation and diag135. Id. at 1048 n.12.

136. Id. at 1049.
137. Id. The district court provided that "[until the legislature acts to establish an unbiased tribunal to conduct the. . . hearings the present facilities of the Commonwealth court
system shall be used for these hearings." Id. at 1049 n.18.
138. Id. at 1049-50.
139. Id. at 1050.
140. Id. at 1052. The district court may have been applying the standard of proof required in adult commitment proceedings. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)
(due process requires "clear and convincing" proof when committing adult involuntarily).
141. Kremens v. Bartley, 429 U.S. 882 (1976).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7201-7206 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
143. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 133-35 (1977).
144. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
145. 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
147. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
148. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-503.1 to .3 (Supp. 1982).
149. The state may in fact be the minor's guardian in many cases.
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nosis.150 Once satisfied that the child was suffering from a mental illness,

the superintendent could detain the child for an indefinite period of time
or release him to obtain other forms of mental health care.' 5' Once detained in this fashion, the child could be released only upon the applicahospital's
tion of his parent or guardian, or upon a determination by the
15 2
superintendent that hospitalization was no longer necessary.
The district court declared the Georgia statute unconstitutional because
it gave parents the ability to commit their minor children to state mental
hospitals in an arbitrary and capricious fashion and for an indeterminate
length of time.' 53 Recognizing that parents' motives in seeking commitment often conflict with the best interests of the child, the court determined
that due process required that the child be represented by separate counsel.' 54 The court did not establish any specific procedures for the protection of such children, however; it merely ordered that hearings be held in
the state's juvenile courts to review the propriety of the commitment of
minor children already institutionalized under the Georgia statute. 55
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 56 The Court first determined
that the appropriate standard for deciding whether the commitment statute
satisfied due process requirements was the three-pronged test enunciated
in Mathews v. Eldridge.'57 The Mathews test requires balancing of the

private interest that will be affected by the state action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and the state's interest in
maintaining the status quo.1's In determining the private interest at stake,
the Court essentially merged the interests of parent and child. Although
the Court recognized the minor's interest in freedom from unnecessary
bodily restraints and from erroneous labelling by state institution superintendents, 59 it found that those interests were largely subordinated to the
parents' interest in controlling the upbringing of their child.' 60 The Court
conceded that parents do not always act in the best interests of their chili50. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1(a) (Supp. 1982). Evidence presented at trial indicated
that admission requirements at the various state hospitals were in fact left largely to the
discretion of the particular institution's superintendent. Those admission requirements varied from independent recommendations by two psychiatrists, referral by a community
mental health clinic, or a finding of "dangerousness" by the superintendent of the institution. 442 U.S. at 591-96.
151. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1(a) (Supp. 1982).
152. Id. §§ 88-503.2 to .3. Review procedures at the various hospitals varied from
weekly staff meetings to unspecified periodic review, and the average length of stay at hospitals varied from 71 to 456 days. 412 F. Supp. at 121 n.14.
153. Id. at 139.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 140.
156. Parham v. J.L., 431 U.S. 936 (1977) (prob. juris. noted).
157. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews the claimant challenged the constitutionality of
procedures used by the Social Security Administration to terminate disability benefits.
158. Id. at 335.
159. 442 U.S. at 600.
160. See id. at 604 (Court holding that it will ignore possibility of conflicting interests
absent showing of parental neglect or abuse).
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ren, but stated that that did not justify discarding the presumption that
parents will act in their child's best interest.' 6' Moreover, parents possess
the judgment needed to make important decisions, judgment the child
lacks. 162 The Court concluded, however, that the risk of error inherent in
the parental decision was sufficiently
great as to necessitate a neutral fact
63
finder in the commitment process.1
In evaluating the state's stake in the commitment process, the Supreme
Court recognized the state's parens patriae interest in providing mental
health treatment to its children.' 64 The Court also recognized the state's
interest in allocating priority to the diagnosis and treatment of patients
rather than to time-consuming precommitment proceedings. 65 Finally,
the Court took note of the state's interest in efficiency, and of the dangers
of pitting parent and child against one another in a judicial contest, in
concluding that the neutral fact finder should be a psychiatrist at the state
66
mental health facility rather than the judiciary.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that
the case should have been decided under the reasoning of Planned
Parenthoodv. Danforth167 rather than under the Mathews test. 16 8 In Danforth the Court recognized that the interests of parent and child may differ
and therefore held that the state could not condition a minor's right to
secure an abortion on obtaining parental consent.1 69 The Court stated that
this result would tend to foster, rather than intrude on, family autonomy
since it would avoid conflict over the abortion decision. 70 In Parham Justice Brennan contended that the voluntary minor mental patient's personal
rights at issue were at least as great as those of the female adolescent seeking an abortion in Danforth.171 Moreover, Danforth involved only a potential parent-child conflict over the abortion decision, while in voluntary
commitment cases a break in family autonomy has already occurred when
the parents seek to surrender custody of their child to a state mental institution. 7 2 Justice Brennan therefore argued that the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children is not warranted in the
commitment decision. Nevertheless, he agreed with the majority that due
process did not require a precommitment judicial hearing. 7 3 The factors
161. Id. at 602-03.
162. Id. at 603.
163. Id. at 606. The Court held that risk of error alone did not provide a rational basis
for holding unconstitutional a voluntary commitment scheme generally in effect in over 30
states. Id. at 612-13.
164. Id. at 605.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 613.
167. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
168. 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
169. 428 U.S. at 75.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
442 U.S. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 634-35.
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making precommitment judicial review undesirable, however, did not in
Justice Brennan's view militate against a reasonably prompt postadmission
hearing. 174 The postadmission hearing would not prevent the immediate
treatment of the child. In addition, much of the evidence at the hearing
would consist of the psychiatric observations and evaluations made by the
institution's staff following commitment of the child. Consequently, the
danger of a destructive parent-child confrontation would be minimized.
Justice Brennan therefore concluded
that at least one postadmission judi75
cial hearing should be required.
On the same day that Parham was decided, the Supreme Court announced its decision in the related case of Secretary of Public Welfare v.
InstitutionalizedJuveniles.176 In InstitutionalizedJuveniles the minor complainants sought a declaratory judgment that application of Pennsylvania's
voluntary minor commitment statute 7 7 violated their constitutional rights
and sought an injunction against further commitments under the statute.
Unlike the varied admissions procedure found in Parham, the Pennsylvania statute codified specific admissions procedures that were in effect
at all state mental hospitals. 78 These procedures required at least one independent psychiatric evaluation designed to determine the appropriateness of institutionalized treatment for the particular child. At the
institution itself, a treatment team could interview parents, compile a complete medical and psychological history of the child, and at their discretion
refuse to commit the minor. The child's continued need for institutional
treatment was reviewed at least once every thirty days. 179 The Supreme
Court found that the commitment statute clearly met the minimum procedural due process standards set forth in Parham. 80
Although the Supreme Court held in Parham and Institutionalized
Juveniles that voluntary minor mental patients were entitled to procedural
due process protections, the Court emphasized the importance of family
autonomy and the presumption that parents act in their children's best interests in limiting the children's freedom. As the recent case of Doe v. Public Health Trust '8' illustrates, however, considerable uncertainty remains
concerning the extent to which parents may exercise their right of control
over the child's treatment program. If state postcommitment monitoring
and review can override parental authority, there is a danger that the voluntary minor mental patient may actually become an involuntary patient
and hence be entitled to greater due process protections.
In Doe the father of a voluntary minor mental patient brought a cause
of action on behalf of himself and his daughter, alleging deprivation of
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
442 U.S. 640 (1979).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7201-7207 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
442 U.S. at 646-50.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 649.
696 F.2d 901 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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constitutional rights caused by the mental hospital's no-communication
rule and the hospital's refusal to allow the father access to his daughter
and information regarding her condition and treatment. The Does had
voluntarily admitted their daughter to an adolescent psychiatric care unit
with the understanding that she would undergo a week-long evaluation
period, during which they would not be allowed to communicate with her.
The Does consented to this requirement, but following the evaluation period were never told of the diagnosis made by the hospital staff. The Does
were told that their daughter had been placed on a privilege system
whereby she would have to earn the privilege of communicating with her
parents. The Does claimed that the hospital then led them to believe that
their daughter would soon earn such a privilege. After a month had
passed, however, the Does began attempts to visit their daughter. The hospital administration would not allow the Does to communicate with their
daughter, and would not provide the parents with any information concerning the hospital's diagnosis or the child's immediate condition. The
parents were able to learn that the hospital was not treating their daughter
was adfor a kidney problem as the Does had suggested it should and
82
ministering medication to the child without parental consent.'
The federal district court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss for
failure to raise a substantial federal question. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the case did raise a substantial federal
question and remanded the case for trial on the merits. 8 3 In reaching its
conclusion, the court redefined the complaint in some respects and provided the district court with guidelines for adjudication of the case on remand.' 8 4 The court of appeals initially rejected the Does' claim that a
voluntary minor mental patient must be treated in the least restrictive environment available. 8 5 The court found that the Does' child was a voluntary patient and, as such, had not suffered a massive curtailment of
liberty.' 8 6 Rather, a voluntary patient "carries the key to the hospital's exit
in her hand."' 8 7 The court also rejected the Does' claim that a parental
right to supervise the treatment of the child forecloses the use of a bona
fide therapeutic no-communication rule.' 88 The court recognized that
some right of communication is necessary for parents to act in the child's
182. At this point the Does attempted to find a new treatment program for their child,
but were unsuccessful because their remaining insurance benefits were no longer adequate
to guarantee completion of an alternate treatment program.
183. 696 F.2d at 905.
184. Id. at 904-05.

185. Id. at 903. In Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976), the district
court held that involuntarily committed mental patients had suffered a massive curtailment
of liberty and thus due process required the patients be treated in the least drastic environment available. 1d. at 1217.
186. 696 F.2d at 903. In his concurring opinion in Doe, Judge Hatchett stated: "It overlooks reality to say, as the majority does, that a child admitted to a hospital by a parent is a
voluntary patient and under the law, should be treated more like an adult voluntary patient
than an adult involuntary patient." Id. at 905.
187. Id. at 903.
188. Id. at 905.
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best interest, as the Supreme Court had emphasized in Parham,'89 but also
stated that this right could be abridged by a treatment program if the treatment was medically legitimate and therapeutic, 90 and was part of the state
benefit being conferred.' 9' The court did state, however, that the Does
should be allowed to attempt to prove that their rights had been violated
because their daughter had become a de facto involuntary patient and that
the no-communication rule was nontherapeutic, medically illegitimate, or
an improper condition upon a state benefit.' 92 The court did not prescribe
any specific test for the district court to utilize in determining whether the
no-communication program was in fact medically legitimate and therapeutic. The two tests that it did suggest,' 93 however, would place a heavy
burden on any plaintiff attempting to attack a given treatment program.
The first suggested test was taken from Youngberg v. Romeo, 194 and applies where the "decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision
on such a judgment." 95 The second suggested test would require the Does
to prove that the medical or therapeutic basis for the rule was a mere pretext. 196 The court also left open the possibility that other actions taken by
the hospital administrators, including the refusal to give the parents any
information concerning the diagnosis of the child or her current status,
turned the patient into a de facto involuntary patient. 197 Given the analysis by the court, however, and the suggested tests for determining the legitimacy of a treatment program, it is unclear to what extent parent-child
communications can be legally impinged upon by the state, or how far the
state could go before a court determined that the child had in fact become
an involuntary patient.
Judge Hatchett, in his special concurring opinion in Doe, would require
a parent either to submit to a particular treatment program or remove the
child from the institution only when that program is the only one offered at
that institution.' 9 8 Thus if other less restrictive types of treatment were
available at the facility, as would almost always be the case, the parents
would have the power to demand less restrictive treatment and reestablish
communication with the child. Judge Hatchett believes this procedure to
be a necessary extension of the principles set forth in Parham, where the
Supreme Court observed that the concern of family and friends will generally provide a check against erroneous commitments. Such an approach
would greatly reduce the gray area left open by the panel majority's opin189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 904; see Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03.
696 F.2d at 904 (citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)).
696 F.2d at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 904 n.l.

194. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 323.
696 F.2d at 904 n.1.
Id. at 910 (Hackett, J., specially concurring).
Id. at 911.
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ion and thereby lessen the likelihood of many otherwise justifiable institutional practices that could substantially impair the child's liberty interest
and the parent's right to supervise the treatment of the voluntary patient.
Many complex questions still remain unresolved following the Supreme
Court's decisions in Parham and InstitutionalizedJuveniles. The Mathews
v. Eldridge analysis employed by the Court in those decisions sets up conflicting rights in the state and parent that could culminate in a situation,
such as that presented by Doe, where a state treatment program impinges
upon the parental right to supervise the treatment of a child and turns that
child into a de facto involuntary mental patient. The Court should alter its
analysis under the Mathews v. Eldridge test or adopt the Danforth analysis
urged by Justice Brennan in his separate opinion in Parham. A realistic
application of facts to those decision models should lead to a conclusion
that would more adequately protect the liberty interests of voluntary minor mental patients.
V.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES TO PROTECT MORE ADEQUATELY THE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF MINOR MENTAL PATIENTS

In Parham the Supreme Court applied the balancing test taken from
Mathews v. Eldridge199 to determine what process was due voluntary minor mental patients. Implicit in the Court's conclusion under the Mathews
test are certain assumptions of questionable validity: that parents usually
act in the best interests of their child when seeking to commit them to
mental health care facilities; that concern for family unity and autonomy
militates against judicial review of commitments; that institutional psychiatrists provide an adequate check against the risk of erroneous commitments; and that the state's interest militates against judicial hearings or
independent observation intended to provide the minor with more adequate due process safeguards. This Comment proposes postcommitment
judicial review and independent professional observation as a more realistic means of protecting the child's liberty interests and satisfying the parents' concern for the proper treatment of the child.
The Court's assumption that parents always act in the best interests of
the child is not well founded. Lower federal courts have taken notice of
the fact that the interests of parent and child may be diametrically opposed
in the voluntary commitment situation. 2°° A substantial number of psychologists and researchers believe that minors committed to mental institutions often do not truly suffer from mental illness, but rather exhibit
20 1
behaviors of which their parents disapprove and feel unable to change.
As noted earlier, in a majority of voluntary commitment cases parents
199. 424 U.S.
200. See, e.g.,
Kremens, 402 F.
(1977).
201. See, e.g.,
1182-83.

319 (1976).
J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136-37 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Bartley v.
Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1975),vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119
B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 38; Comment, supra note 29, at
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have not sought any other form of mental health care for their child prior
20 2
to seeking commitment.
Not only are the interests of parent and child often opposed in the voluntary commitment situation, but the risk inherent in the commitment
process is also far greater than the Court chooses to recognize. The Court's
lack of awareness is particularly evident when one considers that the Court
placed great emphasis on the ability of institutional psychiatrists to make
independent judgments in the best interest of the child. 20 3 The probability
of an erroneous psychiatric determination is quite high, and the harm that
a child may suffer from an improvident commitment is significant. Although all persons committed to state hospitals face the dangers of poor
care, lowered self-esteem, and reinforcement of aberrant behaviors, these
dangers may be particularly acute in the case of minor mental patients.
Reliance on the independent diagnosis of the institutional psychiatrist is
therefore inappropriate. While the state may disfavor more stringent procedural safeguards out of fear that they will prevent quick treatment and
will be fiscally unworkable, the state's interest in committing and spending
funds on only those in need should be just as great.
For the reasons set out above, the procedural safeguards provided by the
Court in its Parham decision are inadequate. More stringent measures,
such as those suggested by the district court in Bartley v. Kremens,2°4 are
called for. A postcommitment probable cause hearing within seventy-two
hours of the initial commitment would prevent totally unwarranted commitments while allowing parents to engage the services of mental health
care professionals without preliminary judicial intervention. State concern
for the prompt treatment of the mentally ill would be satisfied. The probable cause hearing could be followed in two weeks by a formal judicial
hearing. By this time hospital staff members would have had an opportunity to observe the child and diagnose his condition. As Justice Brennan
suggested in Parham, most of the evidence presented in that hearing would
be provided by hospital psychologists or liaisons, thereby eliminating
much of the feared conflict between parent and child in an adjudicative
proceeding. 20 5 The minor should be represented by his own counsel at
these proceedings, so that any evidence that would tend to show an improper parental motive or erroneous diagnosis could be presented. Although such an approach clearly deemphasizes the role of the parent in the
initial commitment process, parental supervision of the treatment program
and a parental right of access to the child and to relevant medical information are essential means of protecting the due process rights of the voluntary minor mental patient, and are essential elements in the Supreme
Court's definition of a voluntary minor mental patient. The minor is in the
hospital voluntarily only to the extent that his parents have volunteered
202.
203.
204.
205.

NIMH Statistical Note 90, supra note 28, table 9.
See Parham, 442 U.S. at 607.
402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), Pacatedand remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
Parham, 442 U.S. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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him. Only through the parent may a voluntary minor mental patient refuse or seek to modify treatment, or seek release from the mental hospital.
When the parents cannot supervise treatment and do not have access to the
child and to information concerning the child's condition, the child has
become a de facto involuntary patient. The parens patriae interest of the
state is not served when parents are forced to remove their children from
treatment facilities for the reason that the deprivation of their rights and
their children's rights are part and parcel of the state benefit being
conferred.

2

0

6

Increased procedural safeguards may also be provided under the Danforth analysis 20 7 suggested by Justice Brennan in his Parham dissent.208 In

Danforth the Supreme Court held that a state cannot condition a minor's
right to abortion on obtaining parental consent. In so holding, the Court
emphasized that the minor's right to an abortion is an important one and
that a confrontation between parent and child on the abortion issue should
be avoided in order to preserve family unity. 20 9 When, as here, a juvenile

is committed to a mental hospital, an important personal right is also involved. Minors should have the opportunity to participate in a decisionmaking process that may lead to their commitment. Moreover, a break in
family unity has already occurred when parents have resorted to outside
means of dealing with a problem by seeking to commit their child to a
mental institution. Thus the Court's concern for family unity should not
militate against some form of judicial hearing to determine the appropriateness of an initial commitment of the minor. The Danforth approach
might provide a more workable means of analyzing cases involving the
voluntary commitment of minors to mental institutions, since the Mathews
v. Eldridge analysis involved the balancing of only one private interest
against that of the state. Under a realistic analysis, two private interests,
those of parent and child, must be balanced against the interest of the state
in a case involving the voluntary commitment of a minor. The Supreme
Court has held that state intervention in parental decision-making is justified where the parents' decisions are likely to jeopardize the health 2or
10
safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.
Just such a situation is presented when parents211seek to institutionalize their
minor child due to the child's mental illness.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's few pronouncements in cases involving the constitutional rights of minor mental patients have left unclear the extent of
those rights as they interact with the rights of parents and the state. The
206. Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 904 (1 th Cir. 1983).
207. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).

208.
209.
210.
211.

Parham, 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
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gray area created by these cases houses dangers for the minor mental patient and his parents. Only additional, more precise rulings will remove
the uncertainty. This Comment has attempted to set forth the risks of
improvident or ill-motivated commitments to mental institutions, in the
hope that a more realistic appraisal of Supreme Court decision models will
lead to more adequate protection of the liberty interests of voluntary minor mental patients. Minor mental patients are a politically powerless and
relatively invisible group who must rely primarily on the wisdom of the
judiciary, as opposed to the initiative of legislators, for protection of their
rights. The issue of how to safeguard those rights presents a most appropriate arena for further Supreme Court action.

